STORE: Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology by Ansari, Md Tarique Jamal et al.
Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Information Sciences xxx (xxxx) xxxContents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of King Saud University –
Computer and Information Sciences
journal homepage: www.sciencedirect .comSTORE: Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering
Methodologyhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
1319-1578/ 2018 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: tjtjansari@gmail.com (M.T.J. Ansari), malenezi@psu.edu.sa
(M. Alenezi).
Peer review under responsibility of King Saud University.
Production and hosting by Elsevier
Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Jou
King Saud University – Computer and Information Scienceshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005Md Tarique Jamal Ansari a,⇑, Dhirendra Pandey a, Mamdouh Alenezi b
aDepartment of Information Technology, BBA University, India
bCollege of Computer & Information Sciences, Prince Sultan University, Saudi Arabia
a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 29 June 2018
Revised 16 October 2018
Accepted 15 December 2018
Available online xxxx
Keywords:
Security requirements engineering
Threat modeling
Security requirements elicitation
Software security
Security attack analysisa b s t r a c t
As we are continuously depending on information technology applications by adopting electronic chan-
nels and software applications for our business, online transaction and communication, software security
is increasingly becoming a necessity and more advanced concern. Both the functional and non-functional
requirements are important and provide the necessary needs at the early phases of the software devel-
opment process, specifically in the requirement phase. The aim of this research is to identify security
threats early in the software development process to help the requirement engineer elicit appropriate
security requirements in a more systematic manner throughout the requirement engineering process
to ensure a secure and quality software development. This article proposes the STORE methodology for
security requirement elicitation based on security threats analysis, which includes the identification of
four points: PoA, PoB, PoC and PoD for effective security attack analysis. Further, the proposed STORE
methodology is also validated by a case study of an ERP System. We also compare our STORE methodol-
ogy with two existing techniques, namely, SQUARE and MOSRE. We have shown that more effective and
efficient security requirements can be elicited by the STORE methodology and that it helps the security
requirement engineer to elicit security requirements in a more organized manner.
 2018 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, several organizations are becoming heavily
dependent on information processing systems to get more benefit
quickly. This dependency has produced a need for protecting soft-
ware systems from threats. Therefore, software security has
become an essential issue (Zulkernine and Ahamed, 2006; Ansari
and Pandey, 2018). Software security vulnerabilities and flaws are
outcomes of poorly built software that can lead to easy exploitation
by the hackers. Inappropriate security requirements engineering is
one of the reasons for developing bad quality software products.
This problem can be reduced by taking security concern into
account from the early phases of the software development process.The development process needs to shape their security properties
by adding security methodology and implementing them correctly,
by observing security principles, and by avoiding defects. Security
requirements guide this design, implementation, and verification
work (Türpe, 2017). Gartner, Inc. forecasts worldwide enterprise
security spending to total $96.3 billion in 2018, an increase of 8 per-
cent from 2017. This report shows that the digital industries are
spending huge money on maintaining security consequences of
regulations, changing and attracting customer mindset, awareness
of emerging threats and the advancement to a digital industry plan-
ning (Gartner, 2018).
The White House cybersecurity coordinator (Rob Joyce, 2017)
has outlined that receiving and maintaining the essential cyber
capabilities to protect the nation creates a tension between the
government’s need to maintain the resources to follow attackers
in the digital world through the use of digital exploits, and its obli-
gation to share its knowledge of flaws in software and hardware
with responsible parties who can ensure digital infrastructure is
upgraded and made stronger in the face of growing cyber threats.
Amoroso (2018) argue that the cybersecurity community, in par-
ticular, has been vocal about finding ways to improve the software,
because most vulnerabilities involve exploitable weaknesses
introduced through badly written code. Security requirementrnal of
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which ensures secure software development from the beginning.
In the last few years, the security has become a crucial issue in
the development and deployment of secure software products.
This crucial issue has been considered by several security profes-
sionals and researchers for publishing research papers on integrat-
ing security considerations into the software development process.
Yet, only a small amount of papers illustrates complex case studies
(Massacci et al., 2005). To solve the security problem with software
and web-based applications, an increasing number of literature
publication, symposium tracks, and workshops in recent years call
attention to the increasing attention of researchers and authors in
designing and developing security requirements engineering
frameworks, techniques, process, and methodologies.
Security requirement engineering relates to non-functional
requirements of the software system which is a very important
task to achieve for a quality software product. Improving the qual-
ity of requirements is thus important. But it is a difficult objective
to achieve. To understand the reason, one should first define what
requirements engineering is really about (Van Lamsweerde, 2000).
Security requirements of computer-based systems, mostly concern
confidentiality, integrity, and availability features (Herrmann and
Herrmann, 2006). Security is considered as a balance between con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability (Olivier, 2002). Security
requirements are a type of non-functional requirements
(Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000). According to (Firesmith, 2004a,
b) security requirement enhanced the quality of the software pro-
duct by adding a necessary quantity of security regarding condi-
tions related to a system and a low level of an associated quality
measure that is essential to convene one or extra security policies.
Engineering software security is an analysis of identifying security
issues for a software product in a systematic approach. This is a
very important process taken into consideration at an early stage
of the software development process for the achievement of the
secure software product. Security requirements are necessary
and it takes place when the stakeholders found that some objects
in the context of the software system are precious, they might be
tangible or intangible, they have some value that the stakeholders
desire to protect (Haley et al., 2006).
Several researchers have proposed security requirements engi-
neering techniques, tools, framework, methodology, and norms for
eliciting security requirements during the early stages of the soft-
ware development cycle. Engineering security requirement into
the early stages of the development process is profitable, secure
and also provides quality software product. Security requirement
engineering should be systematic, repeatable and capable of elicit-
ing complete, reliable, clear, simple and easy to analyzable by the
other members of the software development process (Kotonya
and Sommerville, 1998). Security requirements are often devel-
oped independently of other requirements engineering activities.
Generally, security requirement engineering carried out separately
of other functional requirements engineering activities. Therefore,
many vital security requirements are repeatedly ignored, and the
requirement engineer only focused on functional requirements
by ignoring important security aspects (Mead, 2008). Several secu-
rity requirement engineering frameworks (Yu,1997; Moffett and
Nuseibeh, 2003; Viega, 2005; Lee et al., 2006; Tsoumas and
Gritzalis, 2006; Hussein and Zulkernine, 2007; Haley et al., 2008;
Salini and Kanmani, 2013; Riaz et al., 2016; Ansari and Pandey,
2017; Rehman and Gruhn, 2018), techniques (Jürjens, 2002; Popp
et al., 2003; Peeters, 2005; Firesmith, 2005; Sindre and Opdahl,
2005; Basin et al., 2006; Paja et al., 2015), processes (Toval et al.,
2002; Lee et al., 2003; Zuccato, 2004; Myagmar et al., 2005;
Mellado et al., 2007; Van Lamsweerde, 2007; Shin and Gomaa,
2007; Hassan et al., 2010; Mufti et al., 2018) and methodologies
(Bresciani et al., 2004; Jennex, 2005; Mead and Stehney, 2005;Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
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authors.
Normally, Requirements engineers are well skilled in functional
requirements, but not in software security. Very few requirement
engineers that have been skilled have only been known the basic
security architectural knowledge like password security, encryp-
tion, and decryption. They don’t have deep knowledge of authentic
security requirements engineering. The software system which is
to be developed may have several stakeholders. Only some stake-
holders participated in the development of software products,
but all stakeholders are associated with the software system. Some
stakeholders are capable to help in the identification process of the
asset. They suggest assets of the system from their point of view.
These assets may have vulnerabilities. The threat exploits these
vulnerabilities to get access to the system. The risk associated with
each identified threat is not the same. The attacker has always tar-
geted the vulnerability with high risk. The requirement engineer
categorizes and prioritizes the identified threats. After that, threats
are mitigated by using some security mechanism which fulfills the
security requirements of the system.
The elicitation of effective and efficient security requirements is
an important and challenging task. It is an important task because
there are many problems associated with the consideration of
security issues during the software development phases that must
be overcome. Security requirement engineering is challenging
because there are requirements that such a security-oriented
approach must satisfy. Generally, software security is not consid-
ered by the developers during the early phases of the software
development life cycle (Ansari and Pandey, 2017).
Most security Requirements engineering approach normally
does not comprise all significant stakeholders and does not use
the well-organized techniques for stakeholder identification and
prioritization (Faily, 2015). Normally the security requirements
specification is incomplete, confusing, conflicting, not cohesive,
disorganized, infeasible, obsolete, unable to be validated, and not
usable by their anticipated persons (Mead, 2008). Several authors
have been proposed methodology for analyzing security require-
ments engineering. All effective and efficient security require-
ments should be well organized in a systematic manner
otherwise the software system cannot be evaluated for accom-
plishment. Therefore, there is a need to develop a framework
which is capable of eliciting more effective and efficient security
requirements by considering all the issues which are neglected
by the previous approaches.
The main aim of this paper is to design and develop a security
threat oriented security requirements engineering methodology
that is capable of eliciting security requirement which is effective,
efficient, complete, clear, consistent, organized, feasible, up to date
and easy to be validated. This methodology is especially suitable
for any type of software product that requires security from the
beginning of the development process. This paper presents a secu-
rity threat oriented requirement engineering (STORE) methodol-
ogy which is a ten step systematic process. Here we describe
every step and also the participants involved with every step.
Our main aim in the proposed methodology is to get as many effec-
tive and efficient security requirements as possible for the secure
and quality software product development.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 ‘‘Related
work’’ discusses several security requirements engineering
approaches. Section 3 ‘‘Proposed Approach’’ presents our proposed
methodology for security requirements engineering. Section 4
‘‘Case study” presents the implementation of our proposed
methodology on a case study of ERP web-based application soft-
ware. Section 5 ‘‘Results and discussion’’ compares results of apply-
ing our proposed methodology with two related approaches.
Section 6 ‘‘Conclusion’’ summarizes our work.curity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
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Several requirements engineering approaches have been devel-
oped in order to develop a secure software product. Each approach
represents unique features that make it syntactically and semanti-
cally different from the other one. (Toval et al., 2002) presented a
practical approach for managing the security of the information
systems from the requirement engineering process. This approach
is a particularization of a general-purpose process for requirements
reuse called SIREN, which shortens the development process since
the analyst starts from a reusable set of requirements. (Jürjens,
2002; Popp et al., 2003) presented the extension of UMLsec of
UML to add security-related information within the UML diagram
in a system specification. This security requirements model has
multilevel security and compulsory access control. (Basin et al.,
2003) have proposed a model-driven security approach. For that,
they specialized model-driven architecture paradigm into model-
driven security. After that, they designed an application for devel-
oping software systems through process models, in which they
integrate the process design language UML with a security model-
ing language SecureUML for assigning access control requirements.
The process models in the integration of UML and SecureUML are
used to repeatedly produce security architectures for distributed
software applications.
System-theoretic considerations based approach (Zuccato,
2004) was proposed for the elicitation of security requirements.
This approach shows that security requirements can be described
with the aid of analysis in the business environment, meeting with
all the potential stakeholders and risk investigation. The Tropos
methodology (Bresciani et al., 2004) is anticipated to make the
analysis and design tasks easier in the software development pro-
cess. Tropos approach is based on ranking and revised components
of the i* framework. Tropos approach based on the concept of using
requirements modeling idea of making a model of the system-to-
be within its operational environment, which is incrementally
sophisticated and extensive to provided that both a common inter-
face for a variety of software development tasks and as a founda-
tion for the documentation and development of the software
product. The development phases of Tropos approach are mainly
initial requirement, late requirements, architectural design, com-
plete design, and implementation. Several authors (Giorgini et al.,
2006; Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007; Ali et al, 2009; Dalpiaz
et al., 2009) have proposed the extensions of Tropos. (Giorgini
et al., 2006) is one of the most significant extensions which present
a formal framework for analyzing and modeling security and trust
requirements.
Further (Jennex, 2005) proposed a methodology which is based
on meta-notation to insert security information to access system
development diagrams. This approach considered the technique
of integrating security design into the software development life-
cycle. Another author (Firesmith, 2003; Firesmith, 2004a,b;
Firesmith, 2005) proposed a technique with some steps which
define security requirements from reusable templates. He has per-
formed a security analysis which is based on two fundamental con-
cepts acquired from OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset,
and Vulnerability Evaluation). He proposed security use cases as
a method that should be used to identify the security requirements
that the applications will effectively accomplish to secure them-
selves from the significant security threats in the software devel-
opment process. SQUARE (Mead and Stehney, 2005) is a
methodology which consists of nine step systematic security
requirements engineering methodology. This methodology deliv-
ers a technique for eliciting, categorizing, and prioritizing security
requirements for IT application and software product. The SQUARE
methodology is mainly used for building security conceptions inPlease cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
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SQUARE methodology may also be used for documenting and eval-
uating the security requirements of software systems. Another
author Peeters (2005) extends the agile practices to solve the secu-
rity issues in an informal, open and assurance determined way.
With the intention of rising the agility of requirement engineering,
He sets, advancing the concept of using ‘‘abuser stories”. These sto-
ries identify how the attackers may abuse the system and threaten
stakeholder’s assets. The abuser stories thus make the establish-
ment of security requirements easier.
Sindre and Opdahl (2005) extend the traditional use case
approach to also consider misuse cases, which signify the function-
ality not wanted in the system to be developed. Viega (2005) pro-
posed a subset of CLASP, which is a set of process pieces for helping
development organizations improve the security of their software.
The basic idea behind the way that CLASP handles security require-
ments is the performance of a structured walk-through of
resources, determining how they address each core security ser-
vice throughout the lifetime of that resource. Another approach
which is based on threat modeling for security requirement elicita-
tion done by Myagmar et al. (2005) investigate how threat model-
ing can be used as foundations for the specification of security
requirements and they also present three case studies of threat
modeling.
Tsoumas and Gritzalis (2006) designated a security framework
of an arbitrary information system. This is a security ontology-
based framework which extends the DMTF Common Information
Model (CIM) with ontological semantics with the intention of prac-
ticing it as a container for information system security associated
info. This framework delivers security attainment and knowledge
management in an effective way. Gürses (2006) introduced MSRA
(Multilateral security requirements analysis) method that inte-
grates the process of eliciting security requirements of the end-
users into the requirements elicitation process of a multilaterally
secure system. The aim of this approach is to identify and analyze
security requirements from the multiple views of stakeholders.
Basin et al. (2006) have proposed a model-driven approach for
building secure software system and implemented this approach
in a UML-based CASE tool.
Hussein and Zulkernine (2007) have proposed a framework for
developing components with intrusion detection capabilities. In
this framework, the first step elicits the requirements, in which
the developers detect services and intrusions. Specifically, they
capture user requirements concerning the services and functional-
ities provided by the components and identify the unwanted or
illegal usage of components by intruders. Intrusion scenarios are
elicited through the use of additional approach misuse cases of a
UML profile called UMLintr. Van Lamsweerde (2007) extends KAOS
to comprise the embellishment of security requirements. His pro-
posed approach is a model based and to a certain extent relies
on the use of formal methods when and where needed for RE-
specific tasks, notably, goal refinement and operationalization,
analysis of hazards and threats, conflict management, and synthe-
sis of behavioral models. Mellado et al. (2007) proposed a
standards-based process, named SREP (Security Requirements
Engineering Process) that deals with the security requirements
during the early stages of software development in a systematic
and intuitive way.
Haley et al. (2008) proposed a framework for security require-
ments elicitation and analysis. This framework is based on creating
a background for the software system, demonstrating security
requirements as constraints, and elaborating satisfaction argu-
ments for the security requirements. Hassan et al. (2010) proposed
a formal analysis and design for engineering security (FADES) as
the first goal-oriented software security engineering approach.curity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
Fig. 1. Security requirement engineering concept model for STORE methodology.
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oriented semi-formal Knowledge Acquisition for automated Speci-
fications (KAOS) framework and the B formal method. Salini and
Kanmani (2013) proposed a Model oriented framework to Security
Requirement Engineering (MOSRE) framework that uses a use case
diagram to elicit security requirements. MOSRE has been applied
to E-Health web applications. To determine the security require-
ments, it has the ability to identify, quantify and rank the risks of
security threats and vulnerabilities. El-Hadary and El-Kassas
(2014) proposed a methodology based on problem frames and
abuse frames for security requirement elicitation. They used prob-
lem frames to build a security catalog and to represent security
requirements, while the abuse frames are used for threat modeling.
Paja et al. (2015) proposed STS approach for modeling and reason-
ing about security requirements. In this approach, security require-
ments are identified by the STS-ml requirements modeling
language. The requirements models of STS-ml have a formal
semantics which allows automated reasoning for detecting possi-
ble conflicts among security requirements along with conflicts
between security requirements and actors’ business policies. Riaz
et al. (2016) developed Discovering Goals for Security (DIGS)
framework, that models the key entities in information security,
including assets and security goals. Ansari and Pandey (2017) pro-
posed a framework by integrating three effective security require-
ments elicitation techniques, Threat modeling, Misuse case and
Attack pattern for the elicitation of security requirements.
Recently, authors have discussed and proposed new approaches
to security requirements engineering. Mufti et al. (2018) developed
the Requirements Engineering Readiness Model (SRERM) to allow
organizations to measure their security requirements engineering
(SRE) readiness levels. They conducted two case studies to measure
the usability of the SRERM. Rehman and Gruhn, (2018) proposed
security requirements framework for CPSs that overcomes the
issue of security requirements elicitation for heterogeneous CPS
components.
Several research papers have been published that describes
security requirements engineering in terms of methodology, tech-
niques, process, and frameworks. Most security requirements engi-
neering methods consider the complete CIA triad. Some of them
also address other requirements than security requirements.
Although considering stakeholders view in security requirement
engineering is an important concern, but only some SRE
approaches like MSRA, KAOS, Secure Tropos, SQUARE, STS, DIGS,
and SRERM address this concern. This doesn’t mean that it is
impossible to consider the views of different stakeholders using
other methods. However, most of the security requirements do
not capture this issue in their various activities. MSRA (Gürses
and Santen, 2006) is the only security requirements engineering
approach that proposes steps to establish a compromise between
different security concerns accepted by different stakeholders. All
stakeholders incorporate during this process (Fabian et al., 2010).
The concept of a counter-stakeholder in MSRA cannot be consid-
ered a threat agent, because it does not imply that the counter-
stakeholder will threaten the system. SecureUML is concerned
with access control only. Therefore, general threat analysis is out
of the scope of this method. The proposed STORE methodology
provides steps for considering security interests of all the stake-
holders of the software system and also involves the threat agent
identification and risk analysis for easy, effective and efficient
security requirements engineering.
3. Proposed approach
The following sections describe the proposed STORE methodol-
ogy and its several steps in detail.Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
King Saud University – Computer and Information Scienceshttps://doi.org/10.13.1. Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering (STORE)
methodology
The main contribution of this paper is the proposed STORE
methodology which is our novel work. The STORE methodology
is a ten-step sequential process which provides an effective, effi-
cient and systematic way of eliciting and documenting security
requirements for the software as well as web-based applications
from the early phases of software development. The STORE
methodology provides steps for considering security interests of
all the stakeholders of the software system and also involves the
threat agent identification and risk analysis for easy, effective
and efficient security requirements engineering. In this methodol-
ogy, security requirements are often discussed in the context of
threats. Threat helps the security requirement engineer to calcu-
late the risk associated with it and also represents the adversary’s
abilities. Stakeholder plays an important role in the STORE
methodology. The following Fig. 1 shows the security requirements
engineering concept model for the proposed STORE methodology
where SH represents stakeholder and A represents corresponding
asset.
A software system which is to be developed can have several
stakeholders, only a few stakeholders are associated with the secu-
rity of software products. Those stakeholders, who have security
concern of the software system, have knowledge about the related
assets of the systems which are to be protected from the threats.
The following Fig. 2 shows an activity diagram of STORE
methodology.
In STORE methodology we identify and prioritize all such stake-
holders based on their importance. It is important to consider
every significant stakeholder from the beginning of software devel-
opment. The proposed methodology considers security threats for
identifying security requirements with the help of potentialcurity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
Fig. 2. Activity diagram of STORE Methodology.
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asset identification of the software product. The STORE methodol-
ogy starts with identifying system goals. Each step of STORE
methodology is equally important. The requirement engineer can’t
skip or jump to any other step because it is a systematic approach
for eliciting and documenting security requirement. The STORE
methodology is completely based on threats because after identify-Table 1
Steps in the proposed STORE Methodology.
Step
No.
Step Taking in Appr
1. Identify System Goals Objectives of the proposed system,
Policy and Procedure
Interv
2. Identify and Prioritize
Stakeholders
System Goals Revie
3. Agreed upon Goals System Goals Meet
4. Asset Identification Stakeholder’s Valuable Asset Interv
brain
5. Security Attack Analysis Valuable Asset Secur
6. Threat Identification and
Categorization
PoA, PoB, PoC, PoD STRID
7. Risk Evaluation and
Prioritization
Categorized & Prioritized Threats DREA
Meth
8. Security Requirements
Elicitation
Potential Threats Threa
9. Security Requirements
Validation
Security requirements Revie
10. Security Requirements
Specification Document
Valid Security Requirement Docu
Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
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ing security requirements with the help of threat dictionary.
3.2. Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering (STORE)
methodology steps
The STORE Methodology is a ten-step security requirements
engineering methodology. This section is to clarify the purpose of
each step, the expectations of the participants, what will be the
possible taking in and taking out for each step and also the appro-
priate approach for each step. The following section lists all the
steps of STORE methodology as well as describing the functionality
of each step (Table 1).
Step 1. Identify System Goals
Step 2. Identify and Prioritize Stakeholders
Step 3. Agreed upon Goals
Step 4. Asset Identification
Step 5. Security Attack Analysis
A. Point of Attack (PoA)
B. Point of Belief (PoB)
C. Point of Conjecture (PoC)
D. Point of Dependency (PoD)
Step 6. Threat Identification and Categorization
Step 7. Risk Evaluation and Prioritization
Step 8. Security Requirements Elicitation
Step 9. Security Requirements Validation
Step 10. Security Requirements Specification Document
3.2.1. Step 1. Identify system goals
Identify system goals is the first step of the proposed STORE
methodology. Goals are written or verbal statements that illustrate
the desired outcomes in a software product and the development
team is aiming to accomplish it through several activities. The
goals of a software system have to be identified by the requirement
engineer from the client who wants software product. According to
(Yue, 1987; Van Lamsweerde, 2001) goals are important compo-
nents to identify in the requirements engineering process. Achiev-
ing complete requirements is a major concern for any requirement
engineer. Goals provide an accurate condition for getting satisfac-
tory completion of a requirements specification. The outcome of
requirement specification is complete with respect to a set of goalsoach Participants Taking out
iew, Brainstorming Requirement Engineer,
Client
List of System Goals
w, Analysis Requirement Engineer Stakeholders
ing Requirement Engineer,
Stakeholders
Agreed upon Goals
iew, questionnaire,
storming
Requirement Engineer,
Stakeholders
Valuable Asset
ity Attack Analysis Requirement Engineer,
Security Expert
PoA, PoB, PoC, PoD
E Analysis Requirement Engineer Categorized & Prioritized
Threats
D Risk Assessment
ods
Requirement Engineer,
Risk Manager
Risk Assessment Report
t Dictionary Requirement Engineer Security requirements
w, Walk-through Requirement Engineer,
Security Expert
Valid Security Requirements
mentation Requirement Engineer Security Requirements
Specification Document
curity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
Fig. 3. Four points of security attack analysis.
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and the properties known about the domain considered. For better
goal identification the preliminary analysis of the existing system
is a vital starting place. The requirement engineer can use several
techniques to identify system goals like interview, brainstorming
etc. The output of the first step of STORE methodology is to pro-
duce a list of system goals.
3.2.2. Step 2. Identify and prioritize stakeholders
The second step of STORE methodology is to identify and prior-
itize stakeholders who are associated with software system devel-
opment. Several literature studies are available in the strategic
management field which considers the importance of stakeholder
by discussing organizations in provisions of a stakeholder model.
(Sharp et al., 1999) described that identifying and prioritizing
stakeholder is a vital process and this can be used to evaluate an
organization’s performance and control its future strategic direc-
tion. Several types of stakeholders are associated with any soft-
ware development process. A stakeholder can express security
concerns at different levels of detail (Fabian et al., 2010) According
to (Glinz and Wieringa, 2007) ‘‘A stakeholder is a person or organi-
zation who influences a system’s requirements or who are
impacted by that system.” A stakeholder can be a customer, end
user, developer, requirement engineer, project manager and other
persons who are associated with software development. All stake-
holders are not equally important, therefore we must prioritize the
identified stakeholders. The identified stakeholders may be priori-
tized into critical, major and minor. Each stakeholder has different
security constraints to enforce the same service. Each stakeholder
has their own security needs that may conflict with the other
stakeholder’s needs. (Almorsy et al., 2011). All stakeholders in a
software development do not have equal importance, so (Glinz
andWieringa, 2007) prioritize the identified stakeholder roles with
their importance.
 Critical: The stakeholder’s role is critical if ignoring the stake-
holder may destroy the project or render the system useless.
 Major: The stakeholder’s role is major if ignoring the stake-
holder would have a major unenthusiastic impact.
 Minor: The stakeholder’s role is minor if ignoring the stake-
holder would have a minor impact on the system.
3.2.3. Step 3. Agreed upon goals
Once the system goals and stakeholders based on their interests
are identified, the next step of STORE methodology is to establish a
proper understanding of system goals between the requirement
engineers and different stakeholders. It is essential to articulate
back this understanding to the stakeholders to get definition and
agreement. The requirement engineers and stakeholders both
must be agreed on the identified goals of the software product
which is to be developed. This will create a perfect environment
for the development of a software product in which every stake-
holder can communicate with each other clearly. Definition and
agreement with clear goals and objectives must be documented.
3.2.4. Step 4. Asset identification
Identifying valuable assets is one of the most important and
complex steps of STORE methodology. The outcome of this step
should be complete and correct otherwise this methodology will
not elicit an effective and efficient security requirement. It is vital
to identify all the valuable assets, in order to be able to elicit com-
plete security requirements. Assets may be digital cash, data, pass-
word, information, commodities, people, computers etc. The assets
should be identified with the help of all the potential stakeholders
who are involved in the software development process. The
requirement engineer can use different techniques like question-Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
King Saud University – Computer and Information Scienceshttps://doi.org/10.1naires, brainstorming, interview, analysis, discussion for asset
identification. The objective of security requirement engineering
is to protect these valuable assets from the attacker so assets
should be viewed not only in stakeholder perspective but also an
attacker’s point of view. Each stakeholder identifies assets from
his point of view. Later the identified assets have to be categorized
and prioritized. Further, the identified assets categorized under
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability and prioritized as low,
medium and high level of preference.
3.2.5. Step 5. Security attack analysis
Once the all valuable assets are identified and prioritized, the
next step of STORE methodology is to analyze all the sources of
security attack. Analyzing potential security attacks on a software
system under development is an important step in engineering
secure software systems, as the identified security attacks would
elicit necessary security requirements. The following Fig. 3 shows
the four points of security attack analysis that are essential for
security requirements elicitation.
3.2.5.1. A. Point of attack (PoA). Point of attack for any software or
web-based application is the point from where the adversary can
enter into the system. The adversary always tries to identify PoA
to attack the system. Point of attack represents like a loophole
through which the adversary tries to interact with the system. A
software has many points of attack like login page, sign up page,
data entry page etc. Adversary tries to identify these points so he
can potentially harm the system’s confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
3.2.5.2. B. Point of belief (PoB). Point of belief shows the belief on
external entities of the software system. The software system pro-
vides an access right to the external entities. These entities are
known as the point of belief. Several entities can be the point of
belief for a software product like the anonymous user who visit
the web-based application, authorized users who have valid cre-
dentials, admin of software product, database server administrator
etc. The security requirement engineer must identify all the point
of belief while analyzing a security attack.
3.2.5.3. C. Point of Conjecture (PoC). Point of conjecture shows the
hypothesis about security issues which may be faced by the soft-
ware product in the future after the development. The Point ofcurity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
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has started and these points are very much significant in eliciting
security requirements so this should not be despoiled. Point of
Conjecture should be validated after the development of the soft-
ware product.3.2.5.4. D. Point of Dependency (PoD). Point of dependency shows
the software dependency on external entities. For a software sys-
tem, Point of Dependency could be the reason for potential harm.
The PoD should be valid and authorized because inconsistency
can show the way to a security attack. A software product can have
several points of dependency like the Web server on which the
web-based application depends, the database server, network con-
nection etc.3.2.6. Step 6. Threat identification and categorization
After identifying the four points PoA, PoB, PoC, PoD of security
attack analysis in the previous step, it will be easy to identify the
threats. This step identifies all potential threats to the software
system which is to be developed. The threat is considered as a
source of possible attacks to a software development and vulnera-
bilities are a weakness in the design of software. There are numer-
ous potential threats that may harm the software application.
Although it is not practical to identify all potential threats to a soft-
ware development, all probable threats should be considered.
There are a number of methods of identifying threats such as
reviews of attack histories, reviews of current headlines involving
data breaches, reviews of internet sites, Threat modeling. Threat
modeling is an effective and best way to identify threats and vul-
nerabilities (Ashbaugh, 2008). Threat modeling is a technique used
to look at the potential attacks that can be applied to a given soft-
ware development by breaking down the software into its most
basic components. We have constructed a threat dictionary that
contains a collection of previously identified threats with corre-
sponding most appropriate security requirements. The main inten-
tion is to help the security requirement engineer to elicit security
requirements by accessing the threat dictionary knowledge. This
step of STORE methodology also categorizes each threat through
Microsoft’s STRIDE model. STRIDE (Swiderski and Snyder, 2004)
is a classification methodology for potential threats based on
the threat categories like Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,Table 2
Microsoft’s STRIDE Threat classification system.
Acronym Full form Description
S Spoofing Spoofing threat allows an unauthorized user to
become like an authorized user. In this category
of threat, the attacker gets the log-in credentials
of the authorized user through hacking
techniques such as shoulder surfing, keystroke
logging etc
T Tampering Tampering threat allows the attacker to modify
the data within the software system to get the
intentional malicious goal
R Repudiation This type of threat allows the attacker to claim
that they didn’t perform the malicious activity
because the software system does not have
sufficient evidence to prove otherwise
I Information
disclosure
In this type of threat, the attacker revealed the
protected data, such as login credentials, credit/
debit card number etc. to unauthorized users
D Denial of
service
This type of threat occurs when an attacker can
prevent legitimate users from using the general
functionality of the software system.
E Elevation of
privilege
This type of threat occurs when the attackers are
able to gain additional rights and privileges for
that they are not eligible
Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
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(Table 2).
3.2.7. Step 7. Risk evaluation and prioritization
The next step of STORE methodology is risk evaluation for iden-
tifying potential threats. This step evaluated the impact of threats
on the software application. There are many risk assessment
approach for assessing threats during the software development
process. Mitigation of all the identified threats may not be neces-
sary and economically feasible. The identified threats are ranked
with their potential from the highest to lowest risk. The lowest
rank threats may be ignored because of their low potential to harm
the software system. A typical risk probability formula given below
used in industry shows the risk and consequence of a particular
vulnerability as equal to the probability of a threat occurring mul-
tiplied by the damage potential.
Risk ¼ Probability xDamagePotential
This formula measures the probability and damage potential on
a 10 scale, where 1 represents the least likely to occur and 10 rep-
resents the most likely to occur. According to this formula if the
probability of a threat occurring is 5 and damage potential of threat
is 10 then the risk will be 50%. Risk evaluation can be done by
Microsoft’s DREAD risk assessment model (Swiderski and Snyder,
2004).
DREAD_Risk_Value = (DAMAGE + REPRODUCIBILITY + EXPLOIT-
ABILITY + AFFECTED USERS + DISCOVERABILITY)/5
Another risk assessment methodology is OCTAVE (Opera-
tionally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) is a
very complex risk assessment approach developed by the SEI of
CMU. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) can also be
used to rate the risk by the vulnerability. The Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System provides an open framework for communicat-
ing the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities (Mell
et al., 2007). The Risk Evaluation and Prioritization step of STORE
methodology calculate the impact of threats to assets and priori-
tize the threats with an inclusive evaluation about the degree of
risk to an asset.
3.2.8. Step 8. Security requirements elicitation
The next step of STORE methodology is to elicit effective and
efficient security requirements from the previous output of STORE
methodology. The STORE methodology first considers the threats
with higher risk, then the average risk potential threats and in last
the low potential threats. We have proposed a threat dictionary
that contains a collection of previously identified threats with cor-
responding most appropriate security requirements. The main
intention is to help the security requirement engineer to elicit
security requirements by accessing the threat dictionary knowl-
edge. This step of STORE methodology elicited appropriate security
requirements for each identified threat.
3.2.9. Step 9. Security requirements validation
After the successful elicitation of security requirements in the
previous step of STORE methodology, we get efficient and effective
security requirement for the mitigation of each potential threat.
Threat mitigation is the security feature or assurance techniques
for mitigating specific security threats. Unmitigated security
threats are vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the attackers
to harm the system. Every threat is not potentially harmful to
the software system. Therefore, mitigation of every threat is not
necessary.
3.2.10. Step 10. Security requirements specification document
The last step of STORE methodology is to create the SRS docu-
ment. The security requirements specifications are made and theycurity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
Table 3
Identified system goals for college ERP system.
Goal
ID
Description
G1 The college ERP system will be installed on a web server that has
been secured to protect confidential information. All security patches
for the web server must be enabled
G2 The college ERP system will also be installed on a database server
that has been secured. All security patches for the database server
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specification report will be submitted by the requirement engineer
to the software development team for early integration of security
in software development. (Finkelstein and Fuks, 1989) advocate
that the construction of the specification document by taking sev-
eral stakeholder viewpoints who have different views may be col-
lected through a categorical dialogue that records responses in the
form of statements, queries, rejections, challenges, etc.must be enabled
G3 The database server must be protected from the direct access from
the internet by a firewall
G4 The Web server should be protected from direct access from the
internet by a firewall
G5 Only HTTP and HTTPS ports allowed direct access from the internet
G6 Communication between the web server and database server should
be conducted over a private network
G7 The college ERP system should be deployed over HTTPS4. Case study
4.1. Enterprise resource planning (ERP) system
The proposed STORE methodology applied to the Enterprise
resource planning (ERP) web-based application software. This col-
lege ERP system is capable of managing student records, depart-
ment, faculties, library, and other information. The college ERP
system has all the information about the students, faculties, staff,
library, departments and other confidential information which
requires security. The proposed methodology was applied to this
college ERP system before the development of this software pro-
duct so that the requirement engineer can easily elicit all the secu-
rity requirements needed for this software product. Eliciting the
entire security requirement before the development of a software
product is not an easy task, but the proposed methodology makes
it easy for the requirement engineer. Several literature studies
have suggested several significant success factors in ERP imple-
mentation (Nah and Lau, 2001; Hong and Kim, 2002; Umble
et al., 2003; Al-Mashari et al., 2003; Al-Mashari and Al-
Mudimigh, 2003; Okunoye et al., 2008). For the successful imple-
mentation of an ERP system requirement must be created and
the system requirement should be documented in a proper manner
(Scheer and Habermann 2000). According to Nah and Lau (2001),
an ERP system has the ability to automate and integrate an organi-
zation’s business processes, share common data and practices
across the entire enterprise and produce and access information
in a real-time environment. An ERP system can be highly beneficial
to an organization if the organization is able to overcome the
implementation hurdles. ERP systems cannot remain inside orga-
nizational boundaries. Technically, ERP developers are preferably
considering the browser/Web server architecture over traditional
client/server in order to deliver e-business capabilities. Hence, for
their first-generation e-business solutions almost all big ERP ven-
dors are using a mixed Java/XML strategy (Scheer and
Habermann, 2000).Table 4
List of possible stakeholders with their significance for college ERP system.
No. Name Significance Type
1 President Critical Managerial4.2. Execution of the case study
A case study of an ERP system presented here shows the sup-
port of the STORE methodology for security requirements engi-
neering. Execution of the case study for the validation of a new
methodology is a very common and complex task in the software
engineering field. All the sequential steps of STORE methodology
have been followed in the following section for the effective and
efficient security requirements engineering.2 Director Critical
3 Senior Executives Major
4 Internal Auditor Critical Marketing
5 Purchasing Manager Critical
6 Key users Major
7 End users Critical
8 ERP Project manager Critical Information System
9 Database administrator Critical
10 Developer Critical
10 Networking team Major4.2.1. Step 1. Identify system goals
Identify system goals is the first step of the proposed STORE
methodology. In this step, the requirement engineer collects all
the system goals for the software system which is to be developed.
Requirement engineer can use several techniques to identify and
collect system goals like interviews, brainstorming, etc. For the col-
lege ERP system following can be system goals (see Table 3).Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
King Saud University – Computer and Information Scienceshttps://doi.org/10.14.2.2. Step 2. Identify and prioritize stakeholders
This step of STORE methodology, identify and prioritize the
internal and external stakeholders concerned at different levels
of ERP system development (Table 4).
4.2.3. Step 3. Agreed upon goals
After identifying all the stakeholders related to the ERP system
project the next step of STORE methodology is to make all the
stakeholders agreed upon the proposed system goals. The require-
ment engineers and stakeholder both must be agreed on the iden-
tified goals of the software product for the development. This will
create a perfect environment for the development of a software
product in which every stakeholder can communicate with each
other clearly.
4.2.4. Step 4. Asset identification
The STORE methodology is used to protect the assets from
threats. This step is an important step of the STORE methodology
as this step identifies the assets related to a particular software
system (Table 5).
4.2.5. Step 5. Security attack analysis
After identifying all the valuable assets, the next step of STORE
methodology is to analyze all the sources of security attacks to the
college ERP system. Analyzing potential security attacks on ERP
software system under development is an important step in engi-
neering secure software systems, as the identified security attacks
will help in identifying important security threats. The following
four points are essential for security attack analysis.
4.2.5.1. A. Point of attack (PoA). The following table shows the iden-
tified Point of Attack (PoA) for the college ERP system in a security
attack analysis process of STORE methodology (Table 6).curity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
Table 5
Identified assets of the college ERP system.
Asset
ID
Name Description
A1 Student, staff,
and admin
An asset that relates to a student, staff or admin
A2 Student’s login
data
The student’s credentials: username and
password
A3 Staff login data The staff’s credentials: username and password
A4 Admin login
data
The admin’s credentials: username and password
A5 Student’s
personal data
The personal data that the student enters, such as
student record and assets
A6 Staff’s personal
data
The personal data that the staff enters, such as
staff record and assets
A7 System Assets that relate to the essential system
A8 Availability of
ERP System
If the college ERP system goes down, student/and
staff cannot request or receive quotes
A9 Process Assets that relate to the process of running the
web application
A10 Application Assets that relate to the web application
A11 Login Session The web session associated with a logged in
student, staff or admin
A12 Backend
database access
The ability to interact with the database that
stores, student’s data, staff data, and login
credentials
A13 Student fee
details
The student’s fee record must be secure.
Tampering with this data could cause the loss of
college
A14 Staff salary
details
The staff salary record must be secure. Tampering
with this data could cause the loss of college
A15 Message
Notification
The message notification contains the information
for students and staff
A16 Audit data Attackers might try to attack the system without
being logged or audited
A17 Access to the
record
Only authorized people should be able to view
his/her record
Table 6
List of identified Point of Attack (PoA).
ID Point of Attack Description
PA1 Web Server
Listening Port
(HTTPS)
The port (HTTPS) that the web server listens on
PA2 Login Page Page for students or staff to create a login and
perform a login to the site to begin requesting
or reviewing records
PA3 CreateLogin
function
Creates a new student or staff login (Admin
login must be created directly through the
database stored procedures.)
PA4 LoginToSite
function
Compares authorized person credentials to
those in the database and if credentials match,
create a new session
PA5 Data entry page Page used to enter student or staff personal
data into the database so that the admin can
review it
PA6 RetrieveData
function
Allow the authorized person to view his/her
records from the database
PA7 SubmitData
function
Submits student or staff data to be reviewed by
the admin
PA8 Admin Review page This page used by the admin to review the
student or staff request
PA9 RetrieveData
function
Retrieves student or staff data
PA10 SubmitData
function
Submits any information for the student or
staff
PA11 ListRequests
function
Lists requests ready for review.
PA12 Database Listening
Port
Enables the database to be used remotely by
the authorized persons
PA13 Database stored
procedures
Store and retrieve records in the database
PA14 CreateLogin
procedure
Create a login for the authorized person
PA15 RemoveLogin
procedure
Logout from the college ERP system
PA16 StoreUserData
procedure
Used to store user data from the data entry
page of the ERP system
PA17 RetrieveUserData
procedure
Retrieves the user’s data and request
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tified Point of Belief (PoB) for the college ERP system in a security
attack analysis process of STORE methodology (Table 7).Table 7
List of identified Point of Belief (PoB).
ID Point of Belief Description4.2.5.3. C. Point of Conjecture (PoC). The following table shows the
identified Point of Conjecture (PoC) for the college ERP system in
a security attack analysis process of STORE methodology (Table 8).PB1 Unauthorized
remote user
A user who has connected to the ERP system, but
has not provided valid credentials yet
PB2 Authorized remote
user
An authorized user who has created an account
and has valid login credentials
PB3 Admin Admin uses login credentials to access and
modify the database4.2.5.4. D. Point of Dependency (PoD). The following table shows the
identified Point of Dependency (PoD) for the college ERP system in
a security attack analysis process of STORE methodology (Table 9).PB4 HTTP user A remote user that accesses a page via HTTP
PB5 HTTPS user A remote user that accesses a page via HTTPS
PB6 Web server
process identity
Used to authenticate the web server to the
database when storing or retrieving information
PB7 Database server
process identity
The account that the database server process
runs as, represented by its process token4.2.6. Step 6. Threat identification
After identifying the assets and analyzing the security attack
with the help of STORE methodology, it is necessary to identify
the potential threat for each asset. The following table consists of
recognized threats to a college ERP system (Table 10).Table 8
List of identified Point of Conjecture (PoC).
ID Point of
Conjecture
Description
PC1 Online payment The online payment system can be another function
for this ERP system. If this functionality added, this
function should not provide a way for attackers to4.2.7. Step 7. Risk Evaluation and prioritization
The Risk assessment and prioritization step of STORE methodol-
ogy calculate the impact of threats to assets, and shows an inclu-
sive evaluation of the degree of risk to an asset. The following
table consists of the identified threats with their risk value
(Table 11).attack existing security features
PC2 Payment
Gateway
If added payment gateway in future, ERP system
must comply with PCI DSS or other security
standards
PC3 Encrypted
Communication
If encrypted communication functionality is added
to the ERP system in the future, message exchange
should be completed according to standards4.2.8. Step 8. Security requirements elicitation
This step of STORE methodology elicits the appropriate security
requirement for each identified potential threats. The following
table consists of security requirements for each identified threat
of the college ERP system (Table 12).Please cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Security Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
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Table 9
List of identified Point of Dependency (PoD).
ID Point of
Dependency
Description
PD1 Database
Server
The ERP system depends on the security of the
database server
PD2 Web Server The ERP system depends on the security of the web
server
PD3 Network The ERP system depends on the security of the
network between the web server and database server
PD4 External
SMTP
The ERP system depends on an external SMTP server
to deliver any message
PD5 Session
Management
The ERP system depends on the session management
of the web server being secure
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This step is related to the validation of recognized security
requirements for college ERP system obtained in the previous step
of the STORE methodology. All the identified security requirements
must be capable to enhance the quality of the software system by
enforcing appropriate security concern. In this step, the security
requirements are prioritized based on the potential risk of the
associated threat. The validation of the security requirements pro-
cess consists of security requirement engineers and concern stake-
holders as a participant. They use the review or walk-through
approaches to validate the security requirements for the college
ERP system.
4.2.10. Step 10. Security requirements specification document
Generating security requirement specification document is the
last and crucial step of STORE methodology. All recognized and
validated security requirement is documented in an organized
manner for the college ERP system which is considered as a
web-based application software. This security requirements speci-
fication document assists the developer to develop a more secure
and quality ERP system which ensures security from the beginning
of the software product.5. Result and discussion
This section describes the comparative analysis of our proposed
STORE methodology with two different security requirements elic-
itation approaches that are similar to our proposed methodology.Table 10
Identified threats for the college ERP system.
ID Threat Description
T1 Malicious SQL data in user
input
The attacker might try to inject SQL command
Login.
T2 Login Information Disclosure The attacker gets the login credentials of the a
T3 Session Id Theft The attacker gets the session ID of another au
T4 User Data Disclosure Disclosing another authorized user data raises
T5 Access to the Database The Attacker attacks to the database of the ER
T6 Attack on Admin Login The attacker performs as an admin of the ERP
T7 Blocking Message
Notification
The attacker prevents an authorized user from
T8 User Data Tampering The attacker modifies the authorized person’s
T9 User Account Deletion The attacker deletes an authorized user accou
T10 Crashing the ERP system The attacker crashes the ERP web application.
T11 Unauthorized access The attacker access the ERP system without v
T12 Access without Login The attacker access the information of authori
logged.
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et al., 2005) and MOSRE framework (Salini and Kanmani, 2012).
We have chosen to compare with these security requirements
engineering techniques because our proposed STORE methodology
is motivated by such methodologies in the way of eliciting security
requirements for the software products. We showed that the secu-
rity requirements are more effective and efficient when following
the sequential steps of our proposed STORE methodology.5.1. Comparison with the SQUARE methodology
In this section, we have applied our proposed STORE methodol-
ogy in a case study presented by Gordon et al. (2005). They have
applied the SQUARE methodology for eliciting security require-
ments on a case study of the Asset management system. They eli-
cited total nine security requirements and after requirements
prioritization, they selected five security requirements R01, R02,
R06, R07, R08 out of nine as essential security requirements. The
following table shows the comparison between SQUAREmethodol-
ogy and STORE methodology. We have compared our results with
the essential security requirements obtained by SQUARE method-
ology. The result shows that the STORE methodology covers more
threats than SQUARE methodology and also elicits more effective
and efficient security requirements. Therefore, STORE methodol-
ogy elicits more complete security requirements for the asset man-
agement system (Table 13).5.2. Comparison with the MOSRE framework
We have also applied our proposed STORE methodology in the
case study presented by the Salini and Kanmani (2012). They have
applied their proposed MOSRE framework for eliciting security
requirements on a case study of the E-Health system. They applied
MOSRE in the early stages of E-Health system development, to
identify assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. The following table
shows the comparison between MOSRE framework and STORE
methodology. We have compared our results with the system
asset-based security requirements obtained by MOSRE framework.
The result shows that the STORE methodology covers more threats
thanMOSRE framework and also elicits more effective and efficient
security requirements for the E-Health system. Therefore, STORE
methodology elicits more complete security requirements
(Table 14).STRIDE Mitigated Assets
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Table 11
List of prioritize threats to their DREAD risk value.
Threat ID Threat DREAD Value Mitigated
T1 Malicious SQL data in user input 10 No
T5 Access to the Database 10 Yes
T10 Crashing the ERP system 10 Yes
T4 User Data Disclosure 9.2 No
T8 User Data Tampering 9.2 No
T6 Attack on Admin Login 7.6 Yes
T9 User Account Deletion 7.6 Yes
T12 Access without Login 7.6 No
T2 Login Information Disclosure 6.6 No
T7 Blocking Notification 6.4 Yes
T11 Unauthorized access 5.2 Yes
T3 Session Id Theft 3.8 No
Table 12
List of elicited security requirements for every threat.
Threat
ID
Security
Requirement
ID
Security Requirement
T1 SR1 Use of prepared statements with parameterized
queries
T5 SR2 Use of Access control, Auditing, Authentication,
Encryption, Integrity controls, Backups techniques
T10 SR3 Upgrade to the new version by fixing all identified
flaws
T4 SR4 Use of complex encryption methods that limits
the risks of user data disclosure of ERP system
T8 SR5 Use a firewall and proper authorization technique
for granting the access right to use of the software
system
T6 SR6 Implement account lockout procedure, captcha
and enforce the user of the ERP system to use
strong passwords
T9 SR7 Complex security password and account lockout
should be used which locked the account after
some failed login attempts
T12 SR8 Use firewalls, VPN and SSL techniques
T2 SR9 The database server of ERP system should be
protected from the direct internet access by a
firewall
T7 SR10 Ensure the proper security of SMTP server
T11 SR11 Implement two-factor authentication, i.e. strong
password and one-time passcode
T3 SR12 Use SSL/HTTPS encryption for the ERP system
Table 13
The comparison results with the SQUARE methodology.
SQUARE Methodology results
Essential security requirements
R01 The system is required to have strong authentication measures in place
at all system gateways/entrance points
R02 The system is required to have sufficient process-centric and logical
means to govern which system elements (data, functionality, etc.) users
can view, modify and/or interact with
R06 It is required that the system’s network communications be protected
from unauthorized information gathering and/or eavesdropping by
encryption and other reasonable techniques
R07 It is a requirement that both process-centric and logical means be in
place to prevent the installation of any software or device without prior
authorization
R08 It is required that the AMS’s physical devices be protected against
destruction, damage, theft, tampering or surreptitious replacement
(including but not limited to damage due to vandalism, sabotage,
terrorism or acts of God/Nature)
Results from the proposed STORE methodology
Elicited Security Requirements
SR1 Use of Access control, Auditing, Authentication, Encryption, Integrity
controls, Backups techniques
SR2 Implement account lockout procedure, captcha and enforce the user of
the ERP system to use strong passwords
SR3 Use of complex encryption methods that limits the risks of user data
disclosure of E-Health system
SR4 Use a firewall and proper authorization technique for granting the
access right to use of the software system
SR5 Use HIPAA security standards and policy to ensure proper external
security
Table 14
The comparison results with MOSRE framework.
MOSRE framework results
System asset-based security requirements
SR1 Use secure authentication, which does not send passwords over the
network
SR2 Use secure communication channels
SR3 Use remote procedure call encryption
SR4 Firewall policies that block all traffic except expected communication
ports
Results from the proposed STORE methodology
Elicited Security Requirements
SR1 Use of Access control, Auditing, Authentication, Encryption, Integrity
controls, Backups techniques
SR2 Implement account lockout procedure, captcha and enforce the user of
the E-Health system to use strong passwords
SR3 Use of complex encryption methods that limits the risks of user data
disclosure of E-Health system
SR4 Use a firewall and proper authorization technique for granting the
access right to use of the software system
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In this paper, we have described our proposed approach, Secu-
rity Threat Oriented Requirement Engineering (STORE) methodol-
ogy for effective and efficient elicitation of security requirements.
The STORE methodology overcomes the several limitations of other
existing approaches like they don’t categorize or prioritize the
potential threats, lack of coding standards, process planning and
unorganized documentation of security requirements etc. of sev-
eral other security requirements elicitation approaches. These
issues may lead to complexity of adopting the other framework.
The existing methodology follows the iterative process which
may add advantage to find new security requirements but this will
lead to more complexity to the web applications. The simplicity of
the STORE methodology makes it usable by technical persons and
developers who are not expert in the software security field. STORE
methodology integrates security with the requirements engineer-
ing process based on threats. STORE methodology identifies and
priorities the potential threats and eliciting the most appropriate
security requirements in a systematic way.
The identification and analysis of four points of security attack
PoA, PoB, PoC, PoD makes the identification of threats easier. WePlease cite this article as: M. T. J. Ansari, D. Pandey and M. Alenezi, STORE: Se
King Saud University – Computer and Information Scienceshttps://doi.org/10.1have constructed a threat dictionary that contains a collection of
previously identified threats with corresponding most appropriate
security requirements. The main intention is to help the security
requirement engineer to elicit security requirements by accessing
the threat dictionary knowledge. We have also successfully vali-
dated our proposed STORE methodology by applying this approach
for a case study of ERP system. Hence, we have designed and devel-
oped a security requirement elicitation methodology that is easy to
adopt, extra comprehensive and assist the requirement engineers
to elicit effective and efficient security requirements in a more
organized manner. STORE methodology can be used for the web
applications which consider information as treasure or assets and
evaluated the strength of the methodology. In the early phases of
STORE methodology, we begin the context of the system, the func-
tional requirements, and the primary security goals and require-
ments. The STORE methodology approach presented here has not
yet been validated on a big project. The next step is to deploy it
on a real time project. We want to ensure that our approach iscurity Threat Oriented Requirements Engineering Methodology, Journal of
016/j.jksuci.2018.12.005
12 M.T.J. Ansari et al. / Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Information Sciences xxx (xxxx) xxxpractical, and a suitably accurate assessment requires a real pro-
ject. In the future, we have planned to apply our STORE methodol-
ogy for many other software development projects. The other
future work is to develop a tool for STORE methodology to elicit
security requirements.References
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